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Silence Coerced by Law: A Look at Recent
National and International Efforts to
Silence Offensive Expression
Edward J Cleary*
In closing, I would ask the Court to consider this, that it would be a sad
irony if we diminished the First Amendment right of free expression to
American citizens m this way when the countries of Eastern Europe and
the Baltic States and the Soviet bloc are returning their liberties to their
citizens.
These were my closing words as arguing counsel when I appeared
before the United States Supreme Court on December 4, 1991 m the case of
R.A.V v. City of St. Paul,' known to the public as the "cross burning case."
I represented the alleged cross burner and was challenging a St. Paul hate
speech ordinance. I had planned ahead of time to close my argument in this
manner, provided enough time remained to do so, because I believed it
important to remind the Justices that there was a new spirit of freedom
abroad - a spirit that many had feared ceased to exist after several gener-
ations of Soviet dominance, a spirit that owed much to the American vision
of democracy
Perhaps I was naive in ending my presentation in this fashion; it would
have been more accurate to note the return of "freedom" to the countries of
Eastern Europe rather than the return of "liberties" to the citizens of those
nations. In the months that have passed since the Court found in favor of the
First Amendment in the R.A.V decision, there have been a number of
reminders that, while a level of respect for individual liberty continues in
America, the governments of a number of newly liberated nations (and
* Attorney in St. Paul, Minnesota. Author of EDwARD J. CLEARY, BEYOND THE
BURNING CROSS: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE LANDMARK R.A.V CASE (1994). This
essay was submitted as a result of an invitation extended by the Editor m Chief of the Law
Review following the author's speech at The Frances Lewis Law Center, Washington & Lee
University, on September 26, 1994.
1. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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others not properly designated as newly liberated) have been less than
willing to extend the type of civil liberty to their citizens that Americans feel
is their birthright and a natural consequence of a free society
A Look Back at the Amencan Expenence
Five years ago, Washington and Lee Law School sponsored a Sympo-
sium on "Offensive and Libelous Speech."2 Noted First Amendment scholar
Rodney A. Smolla contributed a fascinating look at racist and sexist speech
and efforts to control it.3 Before examining modem attempts at circumscrib-
ing offensive speech, Smolla considered the opposing political philosophies
that led to our vision of democracy, contrasting the "Aristotelian vision" of
the common good with John Stuart Mill's "libertariamsm"4 or, as I prefer to
think of it, government as parent as opposed to government as partner.
As Smolla noted, these competing philosophies represent "two quite
different impulses concerning the nature of law and the role of the state that
continue to vie energetically for control of our legal culture."' On the one
hand, when the "Aristotelian impulse becomes the dominant mode of think-
ing in a society, there will be an inexorable tendency for the state to think
that it is reasonable to exercise control over speech. "'6 Accordingly,
"[s]peech that promotes the good life and that affirms values of community,
justice, and the rule of law will be fostered and nurtured by the state; speech
destructive of those ends will be condemned. "I This then is the epitome of
the paternalistic vision of government: the codification of community opin-
ion, providing censorship powers to the state in furtherance of the public
good.
Contrasted with that vision, as Smolla noted in 1990, is a "far brasher,
more youthful, more daring, and disorderly philosophy" - what he called
2. Offensive and Libelous Speech Symposium, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv 1 (1990).
3. See Rodney A. Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions About Racist and
Sexist Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv 171 (1990).
4. Id. at 172-74
5. Id. at 173.
6. Id.
7 Id. Interestingly, Smolla anticipated the majority rationale m R.A.V two years
before the decision, stating that "[i]t might be argued that it would be unconstitutional
to draft a fighting words statute that singled out only one species of fighting words - racist
and sexist attacks - for coverage." Id. at 199 n.104. Although Smolla went on to criticize
such analysis, two years later he apparently thought better of it, hailing the R.A. V decision
as one that "will prove to be a long-term enhancement of free speech m America." See
EDWARD J. CLEARY, BEYOND THE BURNING CRoss xvi (1994).
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the "counter vision of individual autonomy "' Those who embrace this
libertarian philosophy see a much narrower role for government, one where
government is more of an equal partner than a father figure, providing for
the common good, punishing criminal conduct, but stopping short of cen-
soring offensive or dissenting expression that fails to affirm the values of
"community, justice and the rule of law "' It is this right - the right to
express an opinion even though it may be discredited, not useful, and not
progressive, even though it may be offensive, even though it may be
wrong - that is an essential element of a citizen's search for self-fulfillment
in a free society
The tension between these conflicting beliefs has existed in some form
in the United States since the debates between the Federalists and the anti-
Federalists two centuries ago. The off-year elections in 1994 were perhaps
a reminder that many Americans are concerned with the amount of govern-
ment intervention in their lives. An overdue recognition has arisen that ogdy
individual choice will voluntarily achieve progressive social policy and that
education is the key to acceptance of different attitudes, physical characteris-
tics, economic backgrounds, and racial and ethnic differences. We may well
be living in a time of backlash caused in part by well-intentioned leaders who
attempted to accomplish by force what can only be achieved by consensus.
As James Madison wrote to Thomas Jefferson almost two centuries ago,
much time must pass before "truths seen through the medium of Philosophy
become visible to the naked eye of the ordinary politician."1"
This has been particularly true in the area of free expression, where
leaders of various groups have engaged in a dangerous exercise of citing
historical wrongs as justification for new interpretations of the First Amend-
ment. This futile exercise does not lead to multicultural empowerment, but
it does result in a type of enforced silence in which each group claims the
status of victim and argues their cause is the most just. The continuing
tension between group rights and individual rights that so preoccupies
constitutional theorists is somewhat misleading. One can strongly support
the Fourteenth Amendment and efforts to end discrinmnation without
standing idly by while the First Amendment becomes a subordinate clause.
Whether or not a group has a viable claim to historical oppression, the
mistake is in believing that enforced civility can coexist with the dissenting
8. Smolla, supra note 3, at 174.
9. Id., see also supra text accompanymg note 6.
10. Alan P Crawford, Founding Fathers' Forum, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1995, at A16
(reviewmg THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON
AND JAMES MADISON (James M. Smith ed., 1995)).
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opinion. We believe that speech is either an end in itself or a means to an
end; if it is protected only as a means to an end, then expression will always
be subject to censorship based upon the majority's disapproval of the mes-
sage. Whether the aggrieved group is defined on the basis of race, religion,
gender, economic status, or sexual orientation, as Ronald Dworkm of New
York University Law School has stated, "It is the central, defining premise
of freedom of speech that the offensiveness of ideas, or the challenge they
offer to traditional ideas, cannot be a valid reason for censorship; once that
premise is abandoned it is difficult to see what free speech means. ""
Further, this freedom to offend or to dissent must be treated apoliti-
cally The central premise of the First Amendment is threatened if either
end of the political spectrum attempts to politicize the basic right of self ex-
pression. Consider these sentiments expressed four decades ago by two
major public figures who could not have been farther apart politically First
are the words of Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, perhaps the best known
conservative serving in Congress m the nud-twentieth century-
Liberalism implies particularly freedom of thought, freedom from
orthodox dogma, the right of others to think differently from oneself. It
implies a free mind, open to new ideas and willing to give attentive
consideration When I say liberty I mean liberty of the individual to
think his own thoughts and live Ins own life as he desires to think and
live. 1
Now consider the words of Justice William 0. Douglas of the United States
Supreme Court, perhaps the most liberal Supreme Court justice of the
twentieth century-
The Framers of the Constitution knew human nature as well as we do.
They too had lived m dangerous days; they too knew the suffocating
influence of orthodoxy and standardized thought. They weighed the
compulsions for restrained speech and thought against the abuses of
liberty They chose liberty "s
This common ground between the Left and the Right as it pertains to free
expression is often lost m the tension of the moment. Liberals often raise
little objection to flag burning, nor do they often see the threat posed by
speech codes; conservatives, on the other hand, have come to realize that,
11. Ronald Dworkm, The Commng Battles over Free Speech, THE NEW YORK REVIEW
OF BOOKS, June 11, 1992, at 55, 61 (reviewing ANTHONY LEwIs, MAKE No LAW- THE
SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1991)).
12. JOHN F KENNEDY, PROFILES IN COURAGE 196, 197 (1964).
13. Beauharnais v Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 287 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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although they may find offensive expression originating on the Left objec-
tionable, by protecting the freedom to display such opinions, they may
prevent the attempts at "progressive" censorship that take place in local com-
munities and on campuses, attempts clearly aimed at conservative thought
and speech.
In recognition of the close relation between the dissenting opinion and
offensive speech, the United States Supreme Court has on occasion protected
expression that many find unworthy of such protection, lacking the char-
actenstics of traditional political speech. 4 Some commentators suggest that
the Court should wait until the threat of censorstup is aimed at expression
clearly political in nature.15 Tis approach is not a good idea for a number
of reasons. The expression that is involved in a case (i.e. flag-burning or
cross-burning) is often irrelevant to the challenge of the law used to prose-
cute such behavior. In other words, laws such as the St. Paul ordinance in
R.A.V and typical speech code provisions have a far wider sweep than a law
targeted simply at fringe expression or opinion. Further, political speech is
almost always put at risk when fringe expression itself is targeted. Better to
protect the frontiers of free expression than to endanger the constitutional
system by waiting until core political speech is put at risk before challenging
an unconstitutional law One could maintain that, just as America has fought
foreign wars far from its shores in defense of freedom, so too, as Justice
Frankfurter stated, the "safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in
controversies involving not very nice people. "i6
Our nation has not always been willing to "forge" "safeguards of lib-
erty " In the past seventy years since the rebirth of the First Amendment
under Justices Holmes and Brandeis, America has been forced to reassess the
cost of liberty generation by generation. On too many occasions, as
reflected in myriad Supreme Court cases, we have carved out exceptions to
the First Amendment with little justification other than collective fear.
During the World War I era, a fear of Germany permeated society (see
14. See Cohen v California, 403 U.S. 15, 25, 26 (1971), wherein Justice Harlan,
speaking for the Court, noted that even speech lacking "cognitive content" and thus perhaps
not recognizable as traditional political speech deserves protection for its "emotive function,
which practically speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall message
sought to be communicated."
15. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTNG OF AMERICA 127 (1990). Bork objected to
the Court's decision in Texas v Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), suggesting that Texas should
have been allowed to prohibit flag burning as long as more traditional avenues of dissent were
available.
16. Umted States v Rabmowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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Abrams v. United States).17 By the 1930s our nation was gripped by a fear
of communism and fascism (see Stromberg v. California).l Later in the
1940s, the fear of and anger at the Japanese led to the unconstitutional
internment of thousands of innocent Americans as racism overcame basic
civil liberties. Following the war, the fear of communism returned (see
Dennis v. United States),9 and the 1960s brought a distrust and dislike of
antiwar symbolism and civil rights demonstrations (see Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District and NAACP v. Button).' Finally,
the past twenty years have brought a fear of anarchists (see Texas v.
Johnson),21 skinheads (see R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul),' pornographers (see
Alexander v. United States),23 and anti-abortion demonstrators (see Winfield
v. Kaplan).2'
It should be noted that, although the Court has not always given a broad
reading to the free speech clause of the First Amendment, it has more often
than not protected expression that goes well beyond traditional political
speech and in doing so has given even more strength to the right of dissent
in America. Three decades ago in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,' the
Court recognized that the right to criticize public officials was a sacred right
in our country, and in the years since, the Court has continued to demon-
strate a belief that it is better to err on the side of freedom than on the side
of those most easily offended.
Liberty did not follow closely on the heels of freedom in America. It
was only after our nation passed through the crucible of the voluntary relin-
quishing of power by Washington, the later election of Thomas Jefferson
signifying the birth of a two-party system and an end to the Alien and Sedi-
tion Acts, and the interpretation by Chief Justice Marshall of the separation
of powers in Marbury v; Madison' that it became possible, both legally and
politically, for later Courts to interpret the First Amendment in an expansive
fashion.
17. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
18. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
19. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
20. 393 U.S. 503 (1969); 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
21. 491 U.S. 397 (1989)
22. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
23. 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993).
24. 114 S. Ct. 2783 (1994).
25. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
26. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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The Expenence of Other Nations
The respect for individual liberty and the dissenting opinon continues
in our nation, but only because we have been "eternally vigilant" about our
birthright. We need only look to other nations to see how fragile liberty is
and how it is not a natural consequence of a free society Consider the
following recent examples.
England
As every law student is taught, the common law rests on well-tested
principles of Anglo-American jurisprudence. The American legal system
has much in common with the English form, yet our nation was founded by
those who rebelled against that legal system, and that right to rebellious
dissent is clearly reflected in the divergent views of libel held by the
Americans and the British. One recent case, Matusevitch v Telnikoff,27
demonstrates the significance of the First Amendment in distinguishing the
American constitutional system from the British form of government. Sev-
eral years ago, the London Daily Telegraph published a commentary by an
English citizen criticizing the BBC for employing certain "Russian-speaking
national minorities." Taken umbrage at the criticism, a Russian Jewish
emigre to the United States wrote a responsive letter to the editor to the same
newspaper accusing the commentator of engaging in antisemitic references.
The commentator sued and won a large judgment in England against the
angry composer of the letter. Judge Ricardo M. Urbma of the U.S. District
Court in Washington, D.C., was asked to rule on the issue of whether or not
the judgment was enforceable in a nation with a First Amendment. Judge
Urbma ruled that British libel law was repugnant to American constitutional
standards of free speech.' In order to collect damages in the United States,
public officials must show malice or reckless disregard for the truth, and
both public and private plaintiffs carry the burden of proving that the
allegedly defamatory statements are false. In Britain, the burden shifts,
making it easier to obtain damages because defendants must prove allegedly
defamatory statements are true since they are presumed to be false and there
is no need to show malice.29
27 877 F Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995)
28. Id. at 4.
29. See Wade Lambert, Libel Enforcement, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1995, at B7 See also
No Reading Behmd The Lines, N.Y. TIES MAG., Dec. 25, 1994, at 8, reporting that Canada
also allows censorship of media, forcing at least one publisher to black out portions of
published work. Such prior restraint would not occur m the United States. Canadian
1673
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1667 (1995)
Undoubtedly the British interpretation of libel contributes to a more
civil discourse and is applauded by public figures in that nation. However,
because Britain has no First Amendment, restrictive libel laws prevent the
openness Americans take for granted, allowing men like Robert Maxwell to
hide financial wrongdoing until it is too late.' °
Singapore
On October 7, 1994, the International Herald Tribune published an
article by Christopher Lingle in which he stated that some Asian govern-
ments utilize "a compliant judiciary to bankrupt opposition politicians."'
The article did not mention any country by name, but Singapore officials
believed the remark to be aimed at their court system.32 The comments
stemmed from the belief that "a number of opposition politicians" had been
"driven to financial rum after losing defamation cases brought by semor
officials" of Singapore's governing party 33 Ignoring State Department pro-
tests, a Singapore judge ruled in January 1995 that Mr. Lmgle and the
Herald Tribune be tried on criminal contempt charges.'
The right to criticize public officials, even court officials, is protected
in America in most instances. In other nations such as Singapore, "the law
values official reputation more than freedom of speech. "35 Since 1941 and
the case of Bndges v California,' Americans have been free to express
their opinion, even offensively, even when it is directed at those who control
their freedom - the courts.
Hugo Black wrote in announcing the Court's opinion in Bndges that "it
is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with
perfect good taste, on all public institutions."37 As Anthony Lewis has
noted, even the courts in Britain have relaxed "their views so that one can
authorities profess to believe m free expression yet appear to remain tied to British notions
of censorship.
30. See Arthur S. Hayes, Britain's Libel Laws Helped Maxwell Keep Charges of
Misdeeds from Public, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1991, at B6.
31. Phillip Shenon, Singapore Judge Orders U.S. Scholar and Paper To Stand Trial,




35. Anthony Lewis, A Prized American Privilege, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 23, 1995, at A15.
36. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
37 Id. at 270.
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criticize judges with little fear of punishment."38 Not so in Singapore; not
so m many parts of the world.
Japan
There has been a trend in Japan that has "profoundly shaped broadcast-
ing, journalism, literature and public discourse over the past several
decades."39 Commentators have referred to this as a "linguistic reign of fear,
a regime of self-censorship in which phrases that could be perceived as
controversial are often suppressed."' "Word hunting," '41 as some have
dubbed it, has infected all forms of communication m Japan. The largest
newspaper in the country deletes 175 offensive words, while a major
television network forbids the mention of 162 words. It is a particularly
virulent form of political correctness, a dangerous attempt to force com-
passion in a society that has a long history of militarism. Some of the words
censored include blind, crazy, ugly, bald, short, and any references to
unmarried status or class membership. Publishing and broadcast companies
hire "word police," who review all forms of communication to delete an ever
expanding list of words found to be offensive. Such censorsip is paternal-
ism at its worst. It does not take a great deal of imagmation to realize that,
if one were forbidden from using words that are physically descriptive but
offensive to some, one would incur a substantial risk when saying anything
critical of a government that enforces such an arbitrary and destructive form
of censorship.
Eastern Europe: Poland/Czech Republic
It seems like only yesterday that Americans were joining with others in
celebrating the return of freedom to the countries of Eastern Europe. Yet if
recent events are any indication, liberty will not be following freedom any-
time soon in at least some of the newly liberated nations. As one observer
has noted, "From Hungary to Uzbekistan, governments have enacted laws
authorizing prior censorship, classifying routine information as official
secrets, and granting public officials such comprehensive protection against
'defamation' that in some countries debate about government policy has been
muted to the point of silence."42 In a horrible and stunning reversal, some
38. Lewis, supra note 35, at A15.
39. James Sterngold, Fear of Phrases, N.Y. IMs, Dec. 18, 1994, § 4, at 1.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Tina Rosenberg, Writer's Bloc, NEw YORKER, Oct. 10, 1994, at 7
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of the nations "simply revived laws the Communists had used to jail dis-
senters, sometimes increasing the prison terms."
43
While many observers will not be surprised by this turn of events, other
developments will astonish and disappoint many People in many parts of
our nation look upon former Polish President Lech Walesa and Czech
Republican President Vaclav Havel with respect and reverence. Yet even
enlightened men make mistakes once m power. If President John Adams
could look favorably upon the Alien and Sedition Acts in the late eighteenth
century, perhaps it shouldn't be surprising that "President Walesa allowed
police to beat up anti-Walesa demonstrators outside Ins office. Polish
journalists have been jailed for attacking politicians in print; the author of an
article in a provincial newspaper served two and a half months for calling
local solidarity leaders 'dopes' and 'small-tune politicos and careerists.' '"'
In the Czech Republic, the parliament renewed at least one "Commumst-era
statute outlawing defamation of public officials and institutions" - a law
smilar in nature to that used to jail President Havel fifteen years earlier. 45
It is sobering to consider that the governments of Poland and the Czech
Republic are among the more enlightened of Eastern Europe. Governments
m Slovakia, Romania, and Albania are even more authoritarian as they move
to censor and punish criticism of government officials. As one commentator
noted:
East Europe's totalitarian nightmare is surely as dead as the ideology that
anmated it, but there are many varieties of unfreedom, and the milder
ones are hardly to be recommended simply because they fall short of the
Stalinist prototype Today's public officials spent their lives in
societies where the leader's word was law and independent institutions
were scarce; criticism was tantamount to treason, and honest dissent was
an oxymoron.'
All this serves to reinforce the notion that we are lucky indeed to live in a
society where liberty has followed freedom and where our nation's leaders,
over time, have come to recognize that the two are inseparable.
43. Id. One commentator suggests that noncommunist Russia has also failed to embrace
freedom: "It is becoming clear that Russian society does not share the democratic values of
the United States. Many 'average' Russians are quite tolerant of repression and con-
temptuous of liberty " Liah Greenfeld, The Intellectual as Nationalist, CVLIZATION,
Mar./Apr. 1995, at 25.
44. Rosenberg, supra note 42, at 7
45. Id.
46. Id. at 8.
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To believe m the supremacy of free expression is to be an optinst, as
Anthony Lewis has noted, and a number of European scholars feel that
America is unique m this regard. Many countries around the world do not
have our history of freedom and thus ban symbols and offensive speech, as
well as encroach upon freedom of the press, m response to their belief that
the dissenting and often hateful viewpoint may undermine the legitimacy of
their government. In spite of all the partisan bickering and despite the low
image of the Congress among the citizens of the United States, we are indeed
optimists and believe that the legitimacy of our government is rock solid, for
too many men and women have given their lives to protect liberties that we
often take for granted. Many have not forgotten the words of Justice Louis
Brandeis, reminding us of our legacy as American citizens: "Those who won
our independence valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They
believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of
liberty they eschewed silence coerced by law - the argument of force
m its worst form."4I
Every time we, as American citizens, greet the dawning of a new day,
read newspapers, listen to the radio or television, engage in political discus-
sions, read books, or watch movies, we should stop to consider the individ-
ual liberty we possess as citizens of a nation where liberty followed freedom.
Then we should consider how different our world would be if expression that
offended a group, any group, could be outlawed. By demonstrating the
confidence to deal with even the most offensive expression, we provide a
framework for succeeding generations of Americans whose defining mo-
ments may well be attributable to the freedoms we protected so conscien-
tiously years before.
47 Whitney v California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
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